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European Court of Human Rights: Ólafsson v. Iceland
According to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Iceland has breached the right to freedom of expression
of the editor of a web-based media site, by holding him liable for defamation. The applicant in this case is Mr.
Ólafsson, editor of the web-based media site Pressan. He published articles alleging that a political candidate
(‘A.’) had sexually abused children. The allegations were based on statements made by relatives of ‘A.’ who had
declared that he had sexually abused them when they were children. These allegations were also forwarded to the
police and the child protection services, but for an unknown reason, the police had not instigated an investigation.
The Supreme Court of Iceland held Mr. Ólafsson liable for defamation, because statements in the articles had
indeed insinuated that ‘A.’ was guilty of having abused children. Whilst the Supreme Court accepted that can-
didates for public service had to endure a certain amount of public scrutiny, it held that this could not justify
the accusations of criminality against ‘A.’ in the media, particularly because A. had not been found guilty of the
alleged conduct and had not been under criminal or other investigation for it. The Supreme Court also held that
Mr. Ólafsson, as an editor, had a supervisory obligation which entailed that he should conduct his editorial duties
in such a way that the published material would not harm anyone by being defamatory. Mr. Ólafsson was ordered
to pay, under the Tort Act, EUR 1,600 for non-pecuniary damages, and compensation for ‘A.”s legal costs of EUR
6,500. Under Article 241 of the Penal Code the statements at issue published on Pressan were declared null and
void.
Mr. Ólafsson complained to the ECtHR of a violation of his right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article
10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The ECtHR found that it has been adequately established
that Mr. Ólafsson’s liability was prescribed by domestic law within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the ECHR, and
that the interference complained of pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of the reputation or rights of
others. The ECtHR however found the arguments for the interference with Mr. Ólafsson’s right to freedom of
expression as an editor insufficiently convincing. In doing so the ECtHR referred to the standards and principles
that the ECtHR has developed when considering disputes requiring an examination of the fair balancing of the
right to respect for private life under Article 8 and the right to freedom of expression. The ECtHR recalled that in
order for Article 8 to come into play, an attack on a person’s reputation must attain a certain level of seriousness
and its manner must cause prejudice to personal enjoyment of the right to respect for private life. The criteria
which are relevant when balancing the right to freedom of expression against the right to respect for private life
are: (1) the extent to which the impugned statement contributes to a debate of general interest; (2) how well
known the person concerned is and what the subject of the report is; (3) his or her prior conduct; (4) the method
of obtaining the information and its veracity; (5) the content, form, and consequences of the publication and (6)
the severity of the sanction imposed.
The ECtHR confirmed that the general public had a legitimate interest in being informed about ‘A.”s running for
general election and of such serious matters as child abuse. It also considers that, by running for office in general
elections, ‘A.’ must be considered to have inevitably and knowingly entered the public domain and laid himself
open to closer scrutiny of his acts. The limits of acceptable criticism are accordingly wider than in a case of a
private individual. Next the ECtHR referred to the obligation for journalists to rely on a sufficiently accurate and
reliable factual basis which can be considered proportionate to the nature and degree of their allegations, such
that the more serious the allegations, the more solid the factual basis has to be. The ECtHR accepted that the
journalist tried to establish the credibility and the truth of the allegations by interviewing several relevant persons,
and that the impugned articles offered ‘A.’ an opportunity to comment on the allegations. The Court reiterated
that a general requirement for journalists systematically and formally to distance themselves from the content of a
quotation that might insult, or provoke others, or damage their reputation, is not reconcilable with the press’s role
of providing information on current events, opinions, and ideas and that “punishment of a journalist for assisting in
the dissemination of statements made by another person in an interview would seriously hamper the contribution
of the press to discussion of matters of public interest and should not be envisaged unless there are particularly
strong reasons for doing so”. The ECtHR was of the opinion that Mr. Ólafsson acted in good faith and made sure
that the article was written in compliance with ordinary journalistic obligations to verify a factual allegation.
Although the ECtHR agreed that the allegations were of such nature and gravity as to be capable of causing harm
to ‘A.”s honour and reputation, it emphasised that the disputed statements did not originate from Mr. Ólafsson
himself nor from the journalist who wrote the articles, but from the alleged victims. Insofar as Mr. Ólafsson’s
conviction may have been in the legitimate interest of protecting ‘A.’ from the impugned defamatory allegations
made by the alleged victims, that interest was, in the Court’s view, largely preserved by the possibility available
to him under Icelandic law to bring defamation proceedings against the persons who made the claims. The ECtHR
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regarded it as significant that ‘A.’ opted to institute proceedings against Mr. Ólafsson only. ‘A.’ had indeed chosen
not to sue the persons making the claims, and that might have prevented Mr. Ólafsson from establishing that he
had acted in good faith and had ascertained the truth of the allegations. With regard the proportionate character of
the order by the Iceland Supreme Court to pay compensation and costs, the ECtHR considered that what matters
is the very fact of judgment being made against the person concerned, even where such a ruling is solely civil in
nature. It emphasised that any undue restriction on freedom of expression effectively entails a risk of obstructing
or paralysing future media coverage of similar questions.
The ECtHR concluded that the Supreme Court had failed to strike a reasonable balance between the measures
restricting Mr. Ólafsson’s freedom of expression, and the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation of others.
The ECtHR held, unanimously, that there had been a breach of Mr. Ólafsson’s freedom of expression and that the
Icelandic judicial authorities had violated Article 10 ECHR.
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